(Prague; 05-02; p.2)
Not surprisingly, more eastern-European states
have been invited to become members, but the agenda of the international
organisation has been broadened.
In the summit
declaration this agenda and the resulting demands are presented
quite detailed. The interesting question is, if and how these
intentions will be discussed politically and put into practice.
To cut a long story short - and thereby reducing
it surely to woodcarving -, here are the main questions to solve:
• Will NATO see itself in future as UN's world
security agency or as military lobby of members? So, will the
alliance accept as justification for missions solely decisions
of the UN security council or will they do with non-UN mandated
constructs of presumed self-defence on foreign territories and
for an unspecified amount of time?
• How will the sizes and structures of members'
armed forces be changed? More to the guide-lines of being capable
to intervene in cases of crisis as well as being structurally
not capable to engage with other alliance members? Or will the
presumed capability to defend one's territory on one's own be
prolonged and simply a component of intervention capability be
• How will institutions of decision-finding
and mission command be restructured so that they remain functional
within the framework of assigned tasks and as well adequately
legitimised? - A question that e.g. the EU had to pose as well.
• Will the burdens of armament and equipment
needs be distributed in a way that reflects the respective abilities
in terms of budgets? Will be counted in that weapons and equipment
producers are parts of several national economies?
• Will further arms reductions, e.g. within
the process of conventional disarmament in Europe, happen as results
of binding multi-lateral treaties or of unilateral behaviours?
Luckily - and against some claims of urgency
- foreign policies develop rather in years than in months. Thus,
there should not be anything in the way of deliberate strategies
and their pursuit.
(end of article)